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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BlJ LLFROG MARINA, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

GILBERT M. LENTZ,

Case No.
12503

Defendant and Respondent.

I - PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioners respectfully move this court for an Order
vacating its decision of September 20, 1972, and to enter a
decision based on the facts of· this case and applicable law
reasonably applied.

II - PREFACE
The principals of law set forth in the Court's opinion do
not appear to support the conclusion of the Court. Several
matters stated in the opinion as though they were proven
facts, are not actually supported by the record in this case.
The decision would have revoluntionary effects upon the
rules of contract construction and the enforcement of the
laws of this state, and create results that we do not believe
this Court intended. For these reasons and the fact that the
decision would encourage litigation in relation to written
contracts, the Court's attention is called to these items which
1

we believe constitute incorrect statements of law and incorrect applications of existing law to fact.
III - NONRESIDENCY AS A BASIS FOR ATTACHMENT
IN THE STATE OF UTAH
. . In order to comprehend the effect of the Court's ruling,
It Is necessary to examine the rule, and we have therefore
extracted the pertinent portions of the rule underlining the
same for emphasis purposes.
Rule 64C(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
" ... The Plaintiff, at any time after filing a Com·
plaint ... against the person or property of a resident of
this state, may have the property of the Defendant ...
attached as security for the satisfaction of any Judgment ... by filing with the Court an affidavit ... and
alleging ... that the Defendant is not a resident of this
state." (Emphasis added)
Under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
1943 (104-18-1) which section was supplanted by the Rule
64C, the first underlined "resident of this state" did not
appear. Therefore, the attachment procedures under the old
law could be directed against all Defendants, whereas the
attachment procedures under the existing rule are limited to
attachment of property of residents of this state. Assuming
that the Supreme Court had a mental intention at the time it
adopted Rule 64C, then it is apparent that two different
meanings were to be attached to the word "resident". This
first time the word "resident" is used would refer to limiting
the number of potential Defendants by determining whether
the person was a sufficient resident of the state so that a
complaint could be issued against that person. The next time
"resident" is used, the purpose would be to determine if that
2

person was not within the State of Utah at the time the
complaint was issued, therefore, "not a resident of this
state". We acknowledge that the Supreme Court could have
been more artful in its selection of language so as to avoid
obvious conflict, but since the Supreme Court did select
language in the publication of its rules, it seems logical that
the S.upreme Court should attempt to make the language
rncamngful and comprehendable. If the Court was describing
a state of mind the first time it used the word "residency",
and the second time the Court in using the word "resident"
was describing a place of physical being, then the rule can be
reasonably applied.
Under this interpretation of the rule, a person having
some contacts in the State of Utah (for instance, the Defendant in this case) and who absents himself from the State of
Utah becomes physically a nonresident. If the Utah rule is
not so construed, a Utah citizen could not institute a quasi
in rem action and, in another circumstance, a Utah creditor
would have to watch Utah assets deteriorate or disappear
while he waited for a sojourning Utah "resident" to return.
The interpretation we have suggested coincides with the
interpretation adopted by the California court in Hansen vs.
Graham (supra), which was cited in the Court's decision.
This Court, in the case of Bristol vs. Brent, 36 Utah 108,
103 Pac. 1076, succinctly stated that if the Defendant is not
within the confines of the State of Utah so that he can be
reached by personal service, a Utah Plaintiff could acquire
jurisdiction by attaching the property of the Defendant.
"In attachment proceedings against a nonresident- Defendant where personal service on him is lacking, it is
elementary that the Court obtain jurisdiction of the
property of the Defendant. This
an ordinarr attachment is obtained by a seizure of it by the officer, and
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this seizure places the property in the custody of the
law to be so held until the Court determines whether or
?ot the
in the action, is entitled to Judgment
m the mam case. When this is determined and Judgment
is entered, then, and then only, can the property that
has been seized be applied to the payment of the Judgment."
The two cases cited by the Court to support its decision
do not support the decision. The case of Hansen vs. Graham,
23 P. 2d 56 (Cal.) was decided on January 27, 1890. The
attachment statute required an allegation that the party was
"not residing" in the state. The Court found that the Defendant was "not residing" in the state at the time the attachment was issued. The Court had little problem with the resi·
dence question because even though the party had a home or
residence in California at that time, he was, in fact, at the
time of the action, in Chile, and therefore a nonresident. The
Court stated:
"But we think the residence referred to is an actual, as
contra-distinguished from a constructive or legal resi·
dence ... the casual and temporary sojourn of another
person in this state, whether for business or pleasure,
does not make him a resident of this state, especially
within the meaning of the attachment laws and especial·
ly if his personal domicile be elsewhere ... the reason
for allowing an attachment against a nonresident
that it was one mode of acquiring jurisdiction in a suit
against him ... but where a man has a settled abode fo.r
the time being in another state for the purpose of bus1·
ness or pleasure, we think that both reason and
ity requiring him to be treated as a nonresident of this
state within the meaning of the attachment law .... "
The case of Jacobsen vs. Keel, 221 P. 21, (Okla.) dated
December 11, 1923, is a more recent case. This case stands
foursquare for the position taken by the Plaintiff and not the
4

position taken by the Defendant or the Court. The ruling in
this case is:
" ... hut residence is acquired by actual presence in the
state coupled with the intention to remain there per-

manently or for an indefinite period." (Emphasis added)

The case is cited in West's Pacific Digest "Attachment, 25" as
requiring actual presence in the state. The Defendant was
physically present in the State of Oklahoma; therefore, the
finding of the trial court that he was a resident of the State
of Oklahoma was sustained.
The factual items supporting a finding of nonresidency
of the Defendant Lentz and of the Defendant's intentions
arr:

1. The affidavit on the Utah State income tax return declaring that the Defendant was a resident of the
State of California and a nonresident of the State of
Utah. The affidavit was signed substantially after the
date of the issuance of the attachment;
2. The Record, pages 25 and 38 and Exhibit No.
21, (Sunset Magazine issued for February, 1970 the
month of the attachment) each list the Plaintiff's residence as Fillmore, California;
3. Pages 19 and 35 of the Record which contain
two letters of Mr. Lentz dated January 19, 1970 and
January 20, 1970 wherein he indicated his home
as Fillmore, California, and which correspondence is directed to the Plaintiff by Defendant, Mr. Lentz, within
two or three days of the issuance of the attachment;
4. That the Defendant's children attended California schools;
5

5. That the Defendant's automobile drivers license ,
and all vehicle and trailer registrations were California:
and
6. That Defendant was outside the territorial
limits of Utah.
The Court's decision effectively eliminates the ground
of "nonresidcncy" as a basis for attachment in the State of
Utah. When residency for determination of attachment depends upon the mental attitude of the attached party as disclosed at trial, it is obvious that a practioner cannot expose
his client to claim of unlawful attachment and risk the exposure on the client's bond.
If, in the application of "modern law" or in the exercise
of the power of "judicial legislation" the Court does not
want to retain nonresidency as a basis for attachment, then,
rather than writing a decision to amend the law, would it not
be appropriate for the Court to merely modify its rules of
Civil Procedure to eliminate nonresidency as a ground for
attachment? It would certainly be fairer as it relates to those
citizens of the stale who have relied on the written rule and
stare deeisis.

Since all the cases cited by the Court sustain the posi·
tion of the Plaintiff, the Court should revise its opinion to
support the position of the Plaintiff.

IV - THE ACCOUNTING CHANGE BY THE SUPREME
COllRT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
We should like to refer to the accounting as contained in
the Court's opinion. The second item of that accounting is
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the sum of $19,913.30. This amount is comprised of the
following amounts:
1. $16,864.21 - This amount was paid by Mr.
Lentz to Bullfrog Marina, Inc. in accordance with his
several accountings (Line 11, Exhibit 14).

2.
- This amount was a transfer by
Bullfrog Manna, Inc. from its First Security Bankamericard account to the Bullfrog Houseboat account. It is a
trans{ er of funds only. There is no evidence in the
record at any place that these funds were income from
the operation (R 166, 167, Exhibit D 34).
3. $3.00 - This amount is a miscellaneous deposit
on October 31, 1969, the source of which could not be
identified. Please note that this deposit occurred after
the season had closed and operations had terminated.
The CPA who testified for Bullfrog indicated he had
made an analysis of the Bullfrog Marina Houseboat checking
account and that the funds above referred to were derived as
indicated. The CPA representing the Defendant made no such
representation and did not even purport to have analyzed the
source of the deposits to the Bullfrog account. The only
testimony of record as to derivation of the funds is the testimony of Mr. Rhodes and his accounting statements, which
are exhibits in this case. On the record, Transcript 166, Mr.
Rhodes stated:
" ... a transfer of funds from Bullfrog Marina First
Security Bankamericard account ... there is definitely
not a double deduction .... "
Transcript 167, Mr. Rhodes stated on cross
Q: Then for the month of October you have
of Three Thousand Fifty-two dollars and s1xty-nme
cents, don't you?
7

A: Yes, and that's the transfer of funds from Bullfrog. !
Reference to Exhibit D-34 indicates the transfer of I
funds on the photocopy of the bank account itself. The
figure is composed of the internal transfer of funds above
figure is composes of the internal transfer of funds above
referred to ($3,052.69) together with the $3.00 unidentified
deposit previously mentioned and $100.00 which was paid to ,
the Defendant on December 6, 1969, which is after the date
of the accounting.
Even assuming the Court could find evidence in the
record that the $3,052.69 item was not a transfer of funds
and was revenue from the Houseboat account, nevertheless,
the Plaintiff has still paid the Defendant, Mr. Letnz, the
$100.00 and now is being charged for this amount again.
The trial court's decision as to accounting should be
sustained by this Court as there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court and no evidence to support the
change. The Court's rule in sustaining the trial court's deci·
sions should be consistently applied within the four corners
of the decision.
V - THE NEW INTEGRATION!
The essence of the rule of contractual interpretation
referred to by the Court and contained in Section 228 of the
Restatement of Contracts is:
Sec. 228: " ... an integration is the writing or the writ·
ing so adopted."
If the court does integrate the contracts, this merely means
that the terms of two contracts become the terms of one
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contract. It does not give the court license to ignore some
terms or vary other terms of the contract.
Restatement of Contracts, Section 230:
"Standard of
Where There is Integration.
of mterpretation of an integration, except
The
where it produces an ambiguous result, or is excluded
by a .rule of law establishing a definite meaning, is the
meanmg that would he attached to the integration by a
reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to
and contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what
they intended to mean." (Emphasis added)
Comment:
(a) " ... But oral statements by the parties of what
they intended the written language to mean are excluded, though these statements might show the parties
gave their words a meaning that would not otherwise he
apparent. Such a common understanding may justify
reformation, hut cannot he the basis of interpretation of
an integration ....
(h) Where a contract has been integrated the
parties have assented to the written words as the definite expression of their agreement.... They have assented to the writing as the expression of the things to
which they agree, therefore, the terms of the writing are
conclusive, and a contract may have a meaning different
from that which either party supposed it to have."
(Emphasis added)
Restatement of Contracts, Section 235:
Comment on Clause (e):
(h) " ... Under the rule stated in this Clause the
meaning of the contract cannot he stretche? by the act;:
of the parties beyond what the language will hear....
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The Restatement and the general law both hold that the
two contracts cannot be integrated where the provisions of
the two instruments, if put together, will not be compatible.
17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, Section 264:
" ... Where contracts are put into several instruments,
each of which has a sensible meaning and may have a
full operation by itself, it would be a hazardous assumption to put them together for the purpose of making
them mean, as one, differently from what they could in
this separate state. Certainly the court cannot do such
violence to the intentions of the parties and the language in which they are expressed as to consolidate
separate instruments where the effect of doing so would
be to avoid an essential part of the contract .... "
(Emphasis added)
17 A C.J .S., Contracts Section 298:
93.10 Rule Limited - (P. 132) " .... if the provisions
of the two instruments if put together will not be incompatible; the court will not do violence to a com·
plete, unambiguous contract by consolidating it with
another writing if the effect of doing so would be to
avoid an essential part of the contract .... "
(P. 132) " ... The rule has been said to be at most
merely one of the construction or interpretation and
cannot be extended to create a contract where none was
intended. It does not mean that the provisions of one
instrument are imported bodily into another, contrary
to the intent of the parties or express provision; nor
does the application of the rule result in actual consolidation of the several contracts .... (p. 133) Where contracts or writing are in fact independent, however, they
should not be considered together even though the
parties may be the same or the same subject matter may
be concerned.
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(P. 134) " ... Where several documents compose the
contract of the parties, the provisions of each must be
given effect, if possible, and all speak as of the same
date .... " (Emphasis added)
1 7A

C.J .S. Contracts Section 319:

"Reason and Equity. Where possible, a reasonable and
equitable construction will be given a contract, but such
rule does not require that harsh and unreasonable terms
be ignored or changed by the court contrary to the clear
meaning of the language used and the intent of the
parties.... (P. 195) However, the rule that a reasonable
interpretation of the agreement is preferred can be invoked only when necessary to make clear that which is
doubtful, and it does not permit the court to override
the plain language of the contract. Moreover, it is not
the province of a court to change the terms of a contract which has been entered into, even though it may
be a harsh and an unreasonable one, since the folly or
wisdom of a contract is net for the court to pass on ...
and the application of equitable principles in the construction of contracts cannot override the terms of lawful contracts. Whenever parties define the limits of their
rights and obligations, the compact controls, and no discretion is lodged in the court to weigh and apply
equities in conflict with such compact. ... " (Emphasis
added)
Now it becomes appropriate to refer to the provisions of
the contracts which, after all, are the agreements of the
parties. The Lease Agreement is quite simple. It provides for
the delivery and the possession of the subject boats to Bullfrog and the payment of a rental based on gross receipts
derived from the use of the subject. It also provides for a
term of two years and for attorney's fees. This contract is not
difficult to construe. The Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's
fees and the leased boats for the agreed term.
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If the contracts are integrated, one portion deals with
physical property (boats) while the other portion deals with
an entirely different commodity (services). It is obvious the
parties can agree that different rules will apply in relation to
services and in relation to physical objects.

The Employment Contract is not really complex. The
terms are not contradictory to the terms involving the boats,
but relate to the Defendant's conduct as an employee. The
contract specifically provides that the records are to be
"under the control of Bullfrog", and the Defendant, in a
specific portion of the contract entitled "CONTROL'', ac·
knowledged he was under the control and direction of Bullfrog. Since the Defendant was an employee under the
direction and control of Plaintiff, why is it an unreasonable
exercise of that control and a basis for termination of the
contract when the Plaintiff requires the advertising it's paying
for be submitted to it for approval and that all money received, in relation to this division, be paid into the corporate
account. These requests, according to the Court's opinion,
constituted a basis for rejection of a contract.
There is nothing in the Lease Agreement even as integrated into the Employment Contract that would require the
leases to be submitted to the Park Service. The Court makes
quite a point of the fact that the Park Service might determine that this was a subconcession agreement. The Court's
attention is drawn to the fact that the only person who
would be damaged by such a determination would be the
Plaintiff who would have to pay an extra fee. The Defendant
would incur no damage. In the "Termination" section of the
Employment Contract, it is interesting to note that there are
separately stated causes for termination by the Plaintiff and
causes for termination by the Defendant. The Plaintiff could
terminate if the Park Service demanded the termination. This
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right was not given the Defendant, hut there were other
reasons for termination specified for the Defendant.
Please note, further, that the contract does not provide
that it will be submitted to the Park Service, but merely says
it is "subject to the Approval of the Park Service" which is a
statement of general law as the Park Service has jurisdiction
over the entire area. Even if the Court should determine the
termination section contained in the two contracts were not
compatible under any reasonable interpretation of the contract, nevertheless, the Defendant is required to give a minimum of two weeks notice, and certainly, under the law, is
not entitled to abscond with Plaintiff's property, its leased
boats, etc. without notice and without paying any damage
for such breach.
This Court, Justice Crockett, in a rather recent case of
Ephraim Theater Company vs. Hal F. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163;
321 P. 2d 221 (1958) succinctly stated contract interpretation rules which the Court now overrules by this opinion. In
the above cited case, the Court stated:
" ... Unless there is ambiguity or undertainty in the language so that the meaning is confused, or is susceptible
of more than one meaning, there is no justification for
interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources.
It would defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to
permit a party to invoke the use of words or conduct
inconsistent with its terms to prove that the parties did
not mean what they said, or to use such inconsistent
words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or
ambiguity where none would otherwise exist . ·.. neither
of the parties nor the court has any right to ignore or
modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely
because it may subject one of the parties to hardship,
but they must be enforced 'in accordance with the in13

tention as manifested by the language used by the
parties to the contract'. "
The new rule of integration developed in the instant
case is that if two separate contracts involve the same parties
and can be related one to another, then Court can hear evidence so as to integrate the contracts. The evidence does not
relate merely to the integration of the contracts, but if the
oral representations of the parties, at the time of trial seem to
conflict with the written documents, then using the excuse of
integration, the documents will be modified to conform to
the oral representation and to create a contract which the
Court, if it had been there, would have created. All general
rules of contract construction are ignored and the Court will
venture well beyond the four corners of the contract and
rewrite the same.
As a matter of minor contract construction, isn't the
Court avoiding the problem of construing the contract by
saying it takes one accountant's interpretation of the wording
of the contract rather than having the Court read the con·
tract and state definitively that the words "all wages and
commissions paid or due during the period will be considered
as costs" does not mean "all wages and commissions" but
only the wages and commissions other than those paid the
manager?

VI - CONCLUSION
The essence of the holding of this Court is that is a
party hires an attorney to draw a contract the parties thereafter in extended negotiation develop the contracts and re·
duce them to unambiguous writings, that those writings will
be modified as to such basic provisions as term, attorney's
fees, payment provisions, and rewritten in accordance with
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the Court's conscience under the guise of the doctrine of
"integration".
The evidence does not support the accounting adopted

by this Court and violates the precept maintained by the

Court that it will sustain the trial court's judgment whenever
' the same is supported by substantial evidence.
The Court should amplify its decision to define when a
resident is not a resident so that citizens will at least have a
guideline in attachment proceedings.
Respectfully Submitted,

Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Bullfrog Marina, Inc.
Plaintiff and Appellant.
80 West Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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